Bug Sweep

Which location is most vulnerable to corporate secrets?

The answer is the executive residence. In our experience, this is the corporate soft spot. FM cordless phones, analog phone lines, answering machines, baby monitors, etc. combine to create the problem.

We recommend a survey of an executive residence in conjunction with the corporate office “post sweep." There is great value in an inspection that highlights potential problems. For example, if an easily intercepted cordless phone is being used, the recommendation is that it be placed with a spread spectrum model that cannot easily be monitored.

One of our corporate clients had an innovative solution to the analog cordless phone problem. They purchased a dozen secure, digital, cordless, spread spectrum telephones that were given to executives to replace their non-secure analog cordless telephones.

Two technicians can complete this type of sweep in about 4 hours. The first part of the sweep is spent looking for radio and video signals. Then, they open and examine the telephones and trace the wiring. The physical inspection is concentrated in the living area. When the inspection is completed the homeowner or his representative is debriefed. Our discussions with the homeowner include information on a broad range of security issues as appropriate. Common items include physical security, shredders, analog cell phones, and safe storage of handguns and how to identify possible surveillance of the residence.

During an inspection of residential answering machines, we explain how they may be used to eavesdrop on conversations. In one recent inspection, we showed how the answering machine would intercept conversations. Someone questioned the housekeeper about the family schedule. This was followed by a break-in where nothing was taken. After the break-in, conversations with the residents were repeated at work. While we were explaining the procedure the homeowner recognized the letters “RM” on the display indicating that the machine was in remote monitor mode. The homeowner said, “I have seen that before!”

In a different residential survey, we found an answering machine problem with a fax machine. The all-purpose device was being used to monitor our client’s home office.

Telephone lines are traced and tested from the instruments to the telephone interface block generally located at the exterior of the residence. In one survey this unsecured interface block was inspected and a radio transmitter was found. In several others, we have found “cross-over” wiring, which facilitated an ongoing line transmission of signals outside the residence.

If specific issues are being investigated, a more in-depth home inspection is performed.

According to the FBI the following types of businesses are under EXTREME risk and are very common targets of illegal bugging, wiretapping, and surveillance:

Materials:

• Materials synthesis and processing
• Electronic and photonic materials
• Ceramics
• Composites
• High-performance metals and alloys

Manufacturing:

• Flexible computer-integrated manufacturing
• Intelligence processing equipment
• Micro- and nanofabrication
• Systems management technologies

Information and communications:

• Software
• Micro and optoelectronics
• High-performance computing and networking
• High-definition imaging and displays
• Sensors and signal processing
• Data storage and peripherals
• Computer simulation and modeling

Biotechnology and life sciences:

• Applied molecular biology
• Computational Chemistry
• Medical technology

Transportation:

• Aeronautics
• Surface transportation technologies

High Threat Personal Situations

You (or someone close to you) have been:

• Involved in any type of litigation or lawsuit
• Have been questioned, arrested, or arraigned by the police
• In the process of getting married, divorced, or separated
• A minister or religious leader (ie: priest, rabbi, deacon, bishop, elder, etc.)
• Running for any type of elected public office
• Elected to any public office (ie: mayor, selectman, school principal)
• Executive or scientist at any large company
• Recently filed an insurance claim
• Engaging in political demonstrations or activism
• Employed by a defense contractor, Department of Energy, etc…
• Private Investigators have been “poking” around
• You are in the upper-income bracket

Keep in mind that anybody with money, power, influence or access to sensitive, classified, or personal information is at serious personal risk.

High-Threat Business Situations

• Your company has stock that is publicly traded (or will be soon)
• Your company is having labor problems, union activities, or negotiations
• Your company is involved in any type of litigation or lawsuit
• Your company has layoffs pending (or they have just happened)
• Your company is involved in the fashion, automotive, advertising, or marketing industry

High Threat Occupations

• Attorney
• Doctor
• Chiropractor
• Dentist
• Architect
• Police Officer
• Court Clerk
• Judge
• Elected to any public office
• Mayor
• Selectman
• School Principal
• College Professor
• Product Engineer
• Software Developer
• Executive at any large company
• Scientist at any large company
• Employed by any defense contractor
• Employed by the Department of Energy
• Any minister or religious leader (ie: deacon, bishop, elder…)
• Corporate Buyer or Purchasing Agent
• Scientists bug other scientists
• Employee of a Construction Contractor
• Any type Sales or Marketing
• Labor or Union Official
• Fashion
• Advertising
• Personnel Directors

Corporate Information At Risk

These are common locations where your company’s infomation is at risk the most:

• Executive offices
• Boardroom conferences
• Mergers, acquisitions & investments
• Marketing & budget policies
• Competitive takeovers
• Financial & tax matters
• Research data & management plans
• Contract details
• Legal matters
• Off site executive meetings
• Executive residences

We are often asked, “How long will it take to do a sweep?” It depends on many variables: the type of structure, the proximity of the rooms, the number of rooms, the type and number of telephones, and other factors. “Sweeps” of government facilities may take days because of complexities and utilization of “exotic” devices available to the government.

Some non-professional countermeasures technicians, when sweeping commercial facilities, walk around the rooms with a little black box with flashing red lights and an oscillating signal and (with a straight face) tell you that the room is “clean.”

Peter Wright, a retired Senior British Intelligence Office describes in his book “Spycatcher” how, in 1956, he assisted the planning of “Operation Dew Worm” by the Counterespionage Department of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The Russian embassy in Ottawa had recently burned and was in the process of rebuilding. The RCMP decided to utilize wired microphones to bug the embassy. When skillfully installed, they are almost impossible to detect.

After the Russians had re-occupied the embassy, the RCMP heard sounds coming from the microphones. Later they suspected the telltale sounds of a Russian Technical Surveillance Countermeasure (TSCM) team in operation. However, they were assured that the Russians had instituted a “search” when they heard tapping at the walls for signs of hollowness and the running of metal detectors across the ceilings.

For twenty days the Russians “swept” the rooms containing the microphones as if they knew that the rooms had been “bugged.” However, the Russians found neither the microphones nor the hard wires attached.

Eight years later, the Russian TSCM team returned and went directly to the rooms “bugged” and within an hour had located all the microphones and hard wire. They searched only in the six rooms where the microphones had been planted. Mr. Wright concludes: “They must have known where to look!” Knowing where to look, what to look for, and using the proper equipment is the key. Within the commercial area, where electronic eavesdropping is most prevalent, the technician that works alone and uses one or two pieces of equipment and is in and out in an hour or so is not doing his job!

On the other hand, the technician who spends his time looking for sophisticated devices costing hundreds of thousands of dollars and utilized by the government against the government is wasting the commercial client’s time and money.

We are licensed California Private Investigators: #PI10194

What to do once we found the bug?

“It looks like we found something!” “What do we do next?” Let’s go through the proper procedure step by step. First, don’t say or do anything to alert the eavesdropper that we may be on to his operation. Never, assume that there is only one device? The “silent search” must continue. After it has been determined that all devices have been located, a decision must be made by the client. We suggest three choices:

1. Leave the device in place and feed it false information.

2. Disable the device in an attempt to lure the eavesdropper to return to repair it.

3. Remove it.

If the client decides to call in law enforcement, the device cannot be disturbed and the area must be continuously secured as a “crime scene” until law enforcement and/or telephone company security arrives to take over the scene and initiate their investigation.

Before anything happens, the devices and the surrounding area must be searched and photographed by the TSCM (Technical Surveillance Countermeasure) team. The possibility of the device being “booby trapped” cannot be dismissed lightly. Intelligence agencies and some professional eavesdroppers have been known to use plastic explosives to destroy the device as it is removed so it cannot be analyzed.

If the device is powered by 110 volts, it must be assumed that all conversation taking place in the target area since the last TSCM search has been compromised. If the device was powered by a battery and it is dead, the same assumption must be made.

If the device is a battery-operated-live-transmitter, a fairly accurate estimate can be made as to how long the device has been operating and how long it will continue to operate.

The client must be interviewed concerning: What has happened or what is about to happen in the area where the device was found? Who has had access to the area? Consider where the device was placed and how long it would take to make the installation. What is the level of building security and who would have a motive? Could an “insider” have knowingly or unknowingly made the installation?

The sophistication of a device/s may give an indication as to the proficiency of the eavesdropper. A sloppy homemade Radio Shack device would indicate an amateur. A well-made, mass produced commercial device could indicate a semi-professional or a government installation. An exotic, expensive or custom-made unit indicates that we are dealing with a cunning professional eavesdropper.

We should next consider the probable range of the device, the frequency, power output and location in the room. With all this information we still face a most difficult task in an attempt to locate the listening post, plus a difficult task of learning the identity of the eavesdropper and his client.

We are licensed California Private Investigators: #PI10194